clothing literature, this study provides an important historical case study for better understanding 23 the more recent industry-wide codes of fair competition. 24
To study this topic, the researcher accessed the governmental hearings on the codes 25 discussed by apparel industry executives during the NRA. The New York Times, Women's Wear 26
Daily and the Journal of the Patent Office Society (which discussed the establishment of the 27 codes) were systematically searched for reference to the codes and the women's apparel industry. Federal Emergency Agency for Public Works that would benefit Americans through direct 38 government expenditure on public works projects ("National Recovery," 1935; Romasco, 1983) . 39
The purposes of Title I of the NIRA were plural and related to the immediate national 40 emergency of the Great Depression: reemployment and industrial recovery (Clark, Davis, 41 Harrison & Mead, 1937; Taylor, 2008) . The Act was touted as "a new deal for demoralized 42 industry on a new philosophy of governmental cooperation" (Cates, 1934, p. 130) . According to 43 the Brookings Institute study, which investigated the procedures of the NRA, Washington 44 became "the industrial as well as the political capital of the nation" (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin, &balanced economy as opposed to the murderous doctrine of savage and wolfish individualism, 48 looking to dog-eat-dog and devil take the hindmost" (Brand, 1988, p. 99-100) . 49
The NRA called on industries to form trade associations and negotiate and submit for 50 government approval so-called "codes of fair practices and competition" (Galambos, 1966) . 51
Forty-three industrial groups including, but not limited to, automobile manufacturing, the lumber 52 industry, the motion picture industry, the wholesale automotive trade, and the dress 53 manufacturing industry participated in forming codes of conduct under the auspices of the NRA 54
("Codes to be Heard," 1933; Fenning, 1934) .
2 Industries as specialized as "pickle packers and 55 powder makers" and manufacturers of everything "from anti-hog cholera serum to wood cased 56 lead pencils" discussed and applied for the approval of their codes (Wilson, 1962, p. 96) . 57
Industry members were instructed to work together to form consensus regarding 58 controversial practices in the best interests of industry, labor, and consumers. The codes were 59 expected to restrict harmful competition, raise wages and reduce hours, encourage the united 60 action of labor and management, and eliminate "piratical methods and practices which harassed 61 honest business and contributed to the ills of labor" (Dearing et al., 1934, p.1; Hapke, 2004) . 62
Objectives for the codes related to the goals suggested by the International Ladies' Garment 63
Workers' Union (ILGWU) to help stabilize the industry (Tyler, 1995 Theoretical underpinnings of the NRA were that increased employment and hourly wages 96 would expand the purchasing power of wage earners. Larger payrolls in turn would circulate 97 through the entire economic system, benefiting retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, and 98 producers, inducing each to take on more workers. Secondly, the positive economic effects of 99 restricting unfair trade practices would lessen risk and encourage expanded business operations. 100
Business reform would encourage national economic recovery (Dearing et al., 1934) . 101
In reality, many industries raised prices in anticipation of the increased operating costs of 102 conducting business under the NRA (Johnson, 1935) . The Brookings Institute found that the 103 positive incentives for business cooperation were relief from anti-trust laws, authoritative 104 enforcement of price control measures, and release from competitive practices. In essence, the 105 central motivating force for businesses' willingness to cooperate with the codes was the hope of 106 raising prices by collective action among competitors through control of the market (Lyon, 107 Howman, Lorwin, Terborgh, Dearing, & Marshall, 1935) . 108
Administration of a Code 109
The first steps in the negotiation of a code were under-taken at pre-hearing conferences 110 between a committee and the deputy NRA administrator recruited from the industries which 111 were to be regulated. These pre-hearing conferences provided the first opportunity of the 112 negotiators to flesh out the different conflicts of interest. The pre-hearing conferences wereMarcketti informal and not recorded. The public hearings were formally conducted, usually by the Deputy 114
Administrator and were publicized through the press, trade and industrial journals, and the 115 posting of bulletins in post offices throughout the country. Nearly all of the hearings were held in 116
Washington and complete stenographic records were available to the public (Clark et al., 1937) . 117
During the first six months of the NRA, negotiated and approved codes of fair 118 competition encompassed the major portions of American industry and trade. By the end of three 119 years, 578 code authorities were developed, 567 codes were approved and 201 supplementary 120 codes covering some 22 million workers in 3 million businesses were established ("Questions 121 and Answers," 1935). In addition there were 2.3 million blanket codes involving another 16 122 million workers. From beginning to end, the code making process and the resulting code 123 authorities which were to administer and enforce the codes were dominated by trade 124 associations, aided by the government's deputy administrators. 125
Code making was not a simple process, and most of the conflicts which punctuated the 126 method occurred among competing businesses within the same industries. These disputes were 127 resolved through a bargaining procedure that put a premium on competitor size and strength. 128
Other problems resulting from institution of the codes were the nearly 5000 petitions for 129 exemptions which companies requested from the NRA and challenges with interpretation of the 130 code provisions. Further, violations of the codes granted some firms advantages over rivals who 131 continued to bear the financial burdens associated with adherence to the provisions. Efforts to 132 enforce the codes were inherently self-defeating as these altered the program from one of 133 voluntary cooperation to one of forced adherence (Clark et al., 1937) . to get the most for their money (Barber & Lobel, 1952) . 142
The increased specialization of garments available from the lowest dollar amounts to 143 several thousand dollars meant women could shop in departments that fit their economic means 144 and social status (Leach, 1993) . Generally speaking, consumers chose to buy less-expensive 145 clothing rather than cease buying altogether. As stated by Richards (1951) The 50% reduction in ten years from dresses wholesaling at $5.39 to $2.62 caused a 153 fundamental shift in the competitive relationship of the industry. The demand for inexpensive 154 dresses was strong, stimulating manufacturers to produce increasingly lower-cost creations. 155
According to a report of the ILGWU, this had a demoralizing influence upon the entirety of the 156 garment business, "The crisis...has practically revolutionized the main lines of dress merchandise
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Marcketti to meet a growing demand for cheaper garments…The production slogan in the New York dress 158 industry has now become not quality but cheapness" ("Dress Trade's Growth," 1932). 159
One of the ways in which manufacturers achieved lower prices was through the 160 contracting system. This method of production proliferated during the 1930s due to the 161 efficiencies of smaller economies of scale. Contractors were more able than large companies to 162 respond quickly to fashion and price changes. As opposed to inside shops in which dresses were 163 manufactured from fabric to sewn-garments in one factory location, contractors or sub-164 manufacturers created clothing out of materials consigned to them by the manufacturer. The 165 manufacturers often supplied designs, piece goods, materials, and credit. The contractors rented 166 factory space and machinery, found and hired a labor force, and directed the production process. 167
The garments were then distributed by jobbers to the retailers (Meiklejohn, 1938) . Because 168 fluctuations in fashion were so great and occurred so quickly, many manufacturers and retailers 169 were reluctant to assume the risk of purchasing materials and stock long in advance of actual 170 production or the start of a season. Due to this, on average, the manufacturing workshops, as 171 distinct from the designing rooms, were busy only 30 to 32 full weeks of the year (Larson, 1963) . 172 To achieve the lowest costs possible and receive agreements for work, contractors bid 173 minimal amounts, competing solely on the basis of labor costs. Manufacturers paid contractors 174 by the piece. Contractors deducted dollar amounts for employees' use of sewing machines, 175 needles, and threads from workers' pay. In the period 1929 to 1933, the average per capita 176 weekly earnings in all of the manufacturing industry ranged from $17 to $27 (Wolman, 1935) . In 177 the apparel industry, many unskilled employees worked 60 to 70 hours a week for $1 to $3 178 (Richards, 1951) . In addition to long hours and low wages, workers often contended with unsafe 179 and unsanitary conditions (Richards, 1951) 
Formulation of the Dress Manufacturing Industry Code of Conduct 218
It was within these conditions that the women's dress manufacturing industry discussed 219 and debated codes of fair practice and competition, negotiating specific terms acceptable to the 220 diverse business groups. The initial code hearings focused on the overall structure of the 221 industry, namely the relationship between manufacturers and contractors. Specific problems such 222 as design piracy were discussed at the hearings, but industry members failed to reach consensus 223 to include these provisions into the code submitted to the president (Hearing on the Code, 1933). 224
As defined in the NRA dress manufacturing code, the dress industry included the sale of 225 women's, misses', and junior's dresses and dressmaker ensembles, with the exclusion of cotton 226
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Marcketti house dresses (Gill, 1935) . 3 The concentration of the major branches of the apparel industry in 227 the New York metropolitan area gave this region preponderant majority on the code. In discussing the necessity of the New Deal policies' attempts to "make capitalism work in terms 269 of industrial democracy," Dubinsky stated, "nobody but a lunatic could believe in a system-or 270
Marcketti rather a lack of system-that produces violent business cycles, mass unemployment and misery for 271 millions of people" (Stolberg, 1944, p. 198) . 272 273 274
Results of the Code Making Process 275
The agreed-upon code, variously called a "treaty of peace" and a "document of fair play," 276 was based on a previous agreement between the NDMA, the ILGWU, and the Joint Board of 277
Dress and Waist Makers Unions of Greater New York ("Dress Code Put Forward," 1933). It was 278
to provide an opportunity to "control" and eliminate "some of the most destructive aspects of 279 competition" in the apparel industry (Dubinsky & Raskin, 1977, p. 125) . By putting into place 280 rules and restrictions, enforceable by the federal government, the playing field would be leveled 281 for manufacturers. It was argued that with trade practices standardized, competition could be 282 predicated upon knowledge, skill, and experiences, rather than cheapness of production (Lasher, 283 1933 ). This standardization would reinvigorate employment and strengthen the impaired 284 purchasing power of the public (Barbash, 1968) . 285
While agreements between employers and union organizations were formulated before 286 the NRA, the dress industry code became the force of law when it was authorized and made 287 effective by President Roosevelt on November 13, 1933 (Dubinsky, 1933) . In an industry with a 288 myriad of differences, ambitions, and personalities, the code was a compromise resulting in one 289 basic and generic law (Lasher, 1933) . 290
The code provided provisions for the length of the work week and wage scale for 291 employees, the registration of contractors by manufacturers, and other labor and trade practices. 292
It divided the major production centers into the five boroughs of New York City; the Eastern 293
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Metropolitan area encompassing Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore; the Eastern area including 294 the New England States, New York State, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland; 295 and the Western area including all regions not previously mentioned. The regions maintained 296 specified wage scales; all outside of the New York City area were paid not less than 85 to 90% 297 of the minimum wages established in the City.
5 Employees were to receive the minimum 298 compensation regardless of time or piece rate ("Text of Code," 1933). Those employees 299 manufacturing garments could not work more than 35 hours in any five-day work week. Other 300 employees, including salesman and designers, could not work more than 40-hour weeks; an 301 exception of six weeks in any one season was granted, provided that the employer paid an 302 overtime rate of one and a half times the normal wage ("Text of Code," 1933). 303
Manufacturers were ordered to pay contractors such a rate so that they could pay their 304 employees the wages and earnings provided in the code's wage scale and cover their own 305 overhead expenses. Contractors were no longer able to undersell fellow sub-manufacturers by 306 lowering labor costs. Manufacturers were also to designate and register with the NRA the 307 number of contractors that they would use to meet their business requirements ("Text of Code," 308 1933). This was to avoid the cut-throat competition stimulated by manufacturers forcing 309 contractors into bidding wars at the expense of labor (Zahn, 1933) . products, rather than cost-cutting measures (Rentner, 1933; "Zahn Predicts," 1933) . Companies 336 that had been paying living wages to workers and maintaining high conditions in their factories 337 would no longer be penalized by cut-throat competition ("Leveling," 1933). According toDubinsky, the minimum wage, "would not only check the merciless competition" of the 339 sweatshop employer but also "protect the better paid, organized worker from the demoralization 340 of wage-scales emanating from the sub-standard shop" (Parmet, 2005, p. 85) . The restriction of 341 total work week hours was said to give designers, in particular, more leisure time to think; before 342 the adoption of the code, the apparel industry was so concerned with "speed, speed, speed" and 343 "chasing money" that it was believed that the forced "downtime" would encourage creative 344 talent ("Urges Aid," 1933, p. 2). The NDMA viewed the code as a "declaration of independence 345 from unfair competition" (Lasher, 1933 and socially successful in that it employed four million workers, added about $3,000,000,000 to 396 the annual purchasing power of working people, eliminated child labor and sweatshops, and 397 inaugurated a "pattern of a new order of industrial regulations" (The New York Times, 1935, p. 398 2). The Brookings Institute took issue with Roosevelt's claims and estimated that only 500,000 399 were added to the employed work force (Dearing, et al., 1934) . They argued that increased 400 employment was achieved primarily because employed workers reduced their hours and received 401 less pay in order to provide work for the unemployed. 
